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 Abstract
 
    This document describes a set of practices for operating the DNS with
    security extensions (DNSSEC).  The target audience is zone
    administrators deploying DNSSEC.
 
    The document discusses operational aspects of using keys and
    signatures in the DNS.  It discusses issues of key generation, key
    storage, signature generation, key rollover, and related policies.
 
    This document obsoletes RFC 2541, as it covers more operational
    ground and gives more up-to-date requirements with respect to key
    sizes and the new DNSSEC specification.
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 1.  Introduction
 
    This document describes how to run a DNS Security (DNSSEC)-enabled
    environment.  It is intended for operators who have knowledge of the
    DNS (see RFC 1034 [1] and RFC 1035 [2]) and want to deploy DNSSEC.
    See RFC 4033 [4] for an introduction to DNSSEC, RFC 4034 [5] for the
    newly introduced Resource Records (RRs), and RFC 4035 [6] for the
    protocol changes.
 
    During workshops and early operational deployment tests, operators
    and system administrators have gained experience about operating the
    DNS with security extensions (DNSSEC).  This document translates
    these experiences into a set of practices for zone administrators.
    At the time of writing, there exists very little experience with
    DNSSEC in production environments; this document should therefore
    explicitly not be seen as representing ’Best Current Practices’.
 
    The procedures herein are focused on the maintenance of signed zones
    (i.e., signing and publishing zones on authoritative servers).  It is
    intended that maintenance of zones such as re-signing or key
    rollovers be transparent to any verifying clients on the Internet.
 
    The structure of this document is as follows.  In Section 2, we
    discuss the importance of keeping the "chain of trust" intact.
    Aspects of key generation and storage of private keys are discussed
    in Section 3; the focus in this section is mainly on the private part
    of the key(s).  Section 4 describes considerations concerning the
    public part of the keys.  Since these public keys appear in the DNS
    one has to take into account all kinds of timing issues, which are
    discussed in Section 4.1.  Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 deal with the
    rollover, or supercession, of keys.  Finally, Section 4.4 discusses
    considerations on how parents deal with their children’s public keys
    in order to maintain chains of trust.
 
    The typographic conventions used in this document are explained in
    Appendix C.
 
    Since this is a document with operational suggestions and there are
    no protocol specifications, the RFC 2119 [7] language does not apply.
 
    This document obsoletes RFC 2541 [12] to reflect the evolution of the
    underlying DNSSEC protocol since then.  Changes in the choice of
    cryptographic algorithms, DNS record types and type names, and the
    parent-child key and signature exchange demanded a major rewrite and
    additional information and explanation.
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 1.1.  The Use of the Term ’key’
 
    It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the concept of
    asymmetric keys on which DNSSEC is based (public key cryptography
    [17]).  Therefore, this document will use the term ’key’ rather
    loosely.  Where it is written that ’a key is used to sign data’ it is
    assumed that the reader understands that it is the private part of
    the key pair that is used for signing.  It is also assumed that the
    reader understands that the public part of the key pair is published
    in the DNSKEY Resource Record and that it is the public part that is
    used in key exchanges.
 
 1.2.  Time Definitions
 
    In this document, we will be using a number of time-related terms.
    The following definitions apply:
 
    o  "Signature validity period" The period that a signature is valid.
       It starts at the time specified in the signature inception field
       of the RRSIG RR and ends at the time specified in the expiration
       field of the RRSIG RR.
 
    o  "Signature publication period" Time after which a signature (made
       with a specific key) is replaced with a new signature (made with
       the same key).  This replacement takes place by publishing the
       relevant RRSIG in the master zone file.  After one stops
       publishing an RRSIG in a zone, it may take a while before the
       RRSIG has expired from caches and has actually been removed from
       the DNS.
 
    o  "Key effectivity period" The period during which a key pair is
       expected to be effective.  This period is defined as the time
       between the first inception time stamp and the last expiration
       date of any signature made with this key, regardless of any
       discontinuity in the use of the key.  The key effectivity period
       can span multiple signature validity periods.
 
    o  "Maximum/Minimum Zone Time to Live (TTL)" The maximum or minimum
       value of the TTLs from the complete set of RRs in a zone.  Note
       that the minimum TTL is not the same as the MINIMUM field in the
       SOA RR.  See [11] for more information.
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 2.  Keeping the Chain of Trust Intact
 
    Maintaining a valid chain of trust is important because broken chains
    of trust will result in data being marked as Bogus (as defined in [4]
    Section 5), which may cause entire (sub)domains to become invisible
    to verifying clients.  The administrators of secured zones have to
    realize that their zone is, to verifying clients, part of a chain of
    trust.
 
    As mentioned in the introduction, the procedures herein are intended
    to ensure that maintenance of zones, such as re-signing or key
    rollovers, will be transparent to the verifying clients on the
    Internet.
 
    Administrators of secured zones will have to keep in mind that data
    published on an authoritative primary server will not be immediately
    seen by verifying clients; it may take some time for the data to be
    transferred to other secondary authoritative nameservers and clients
    may be fetching data from caching non-authoritative servers.  In this
    light, note that the time for a zone transfer from master to slave is
    negligible when using NOTIFY [9] and incremental transfer (IXFR) [8].
    It increases when full zone transfers (AXFR) are used in combination
    with NOTIFY.  It increases even more if you rely on full zone
    transfers based on only the SOA timing parameters for refresh.
 
    For the verifying clients, it is important that data from secured
    zones can be used to build chains of trust regardless of whether the
    data came directly from an authoritative server, a caching
    nameserver, or some middle box.  Only by carefully using the
    available timing parameters can a zone administrator ensure that the
    data necessary for verification can be obtained.
 
    The responsibility for maintaining the chain of trust is shared by
    administrators of secured zones in the chain of trust.  This is most
    obvious in the case of a ’key compromise’ when a trade-off between
    maintaining a valid chain of trust and replacing the compromised keys
    as soon as possible must be made.  Then zone administrators will have
    to make a trade-off, between keeping the chain of trust intact --
    thereby allowing for attacks with the compromised key -- or
    deliberately breaking the chain of trust and making secured
    subdomains invisible to security-aware resolvers.  Also see Section
    4.3.
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 3.  Keys Generation and Storage
 
    This section describes a number of considerations with respect to the
    security of keys.  It deals with the generation, effectivity period,
    size, and storage of private keys.
 
 3.1.  Zone and Key Signing Keys
 
    The DNSSEC validation protocol does not distinguish between different
    types of DNSKEYs.  All DNSKEYs can be used during the validation.  In
    practice, operators use Key Signing and Zone Signing Keys and use the
    so-called Secure Entry Point (SEP) [3] flag to distinguish between
    them during operations.  The dynamics and considerations are
    discussed below.
 
    To make zone re-signing and key rollover procedures easier to
    implement, it is possible to use one or more keys as Key Signing Keys
    (KSKs).  These keys will only sign the apex DNSKEY RRSet in a zone.
    Other keys can be used to sign all the RRSets in a zone and are
    referred to as Zone Signing Keys (ZSKs).  In this document, we assume
    that KSKs are the subset of keys that are used for key exchanges with
    the parent and potentially for configuration as trusted anchors --
    the SEP keys.  In this document, we assume a one-to-one mapping
    between KSK and SEP keys and we assume the SEP flag to be set on all
    KSKs.
 
 3.1.1.  Motivations for the KSK and ZSK Separation
 
    Differentiating between the KSK and ZSK functions has several
    advantages:
 
    o  No parent/child interaction is required when ZSKs are updated.
 
    o  The KSK can be made stronger (i.e., using more bits in the key
       material).  This has little operational impact since it is only
       used to sign a small fraction of the zone data.  Also, the KSK is
       only used to verify the zone’s key set, not for other RRSets in
       the zone.
 
    o  As the KSK is only used to sign a key set, which is most probably
       updated less frequently than other data in the zone, it can be
       stored separately from and in a safer location than the ZSK.
 
    o  A KSK can have a longer key effectivity period.
 
    For almost any method of key management and zone signing, the KSK is
    used less frequently than the ZSK.  Once a key set is signed with the
    KSK, all the keys in the key set can be used as ZSKs.  If a ZSK is
 
 
 
 Kolkman & Gieben             Informational                      [Page 6] 
 RFC 4641              DNSSEC Operational Practices        September 2006
 
 
    compromised, it can be simply dropped from the key set.  The new key
    set is then re-signed with the KSK.
 
    Given the assumption that for KSKs the SEP flag is set, the KSK can
    be distinguished from a ZSK by examining the flag field in the DNSKEY
    RR.  If the flag field is an odd number it is a KSK.  If it is an
    even number it is a ZSK.
 
    The Zone Signing Key can be used to sign all the data in a zone on a
    regular basis.  When a Zone Signing Key is to be rolled, no
    interaction with the parent is needed.  This allows for signature
    validity periods on the order of days.
 
    The Key Signing Key is only to be used to sign the DNSKEY RRs in a
    zone.  If a Key Signing Key is to be rolled over, there will be
    interactions with parties other than the zone administrator.  These
    can include the registry of the parent zone or administrators of
    verifying resolvers that have the particular key configured as secure
    entry points.  Hence, the key effectivity period of these keys can
    and should be made much longer.  Although, given a long enough key,
    the key effectivity period can be on the order of years, we suggest
    planning for a key effectivity on the order of a few months so that a
    key rollover remains an operational routine.
 
 3.1.2.  KSKs for High-Level Zones
 
    Higher-level zones are generally more sensitive than lower-level
    zones.  Anyone controlling or breaking the security of a zone thereby
    obtains authority over all of its subdomains (except in the case of
    resolvers that have locally configured the public key of a subdomain,
    in which case this, and only this, subdomain wouldn’t be affected by
    the compromise of the parent zone).  Therefore, extra care should be
    taken with high-level zones, and strong keys should be used.
 
    The root zone is the most critical of all zones.  Someone controlling
    or compromising the security of the root zone would control the
    entire DNS namespace of all resolvers using that root zone (except in
    the case of resolvers that have locally configured the public key of
    a subdomain).  Therefore, the utmost care must be taken in the
    securing of the root zone.  The strongest and most carefully handled
    keys should be used.  The root zone private key should always be kept
    off-line.
 
    Many resolvers will start at a root server for their access to and
    authentication of DNS data.  Securely updating the trust anchors in
    an enormous population of resolvers around the world will be
    extremely difficult.
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 3.2.  Key Generation
 
    Careful generation of all keys is a sometimes overlooked but
    absolutely essential element in any cryptographically secure system.
    The strongest algorithms used with the longest keys are still of no
    use if an adversary can guess enough to lower the size of the likely
    key space so that it can be exhaustively searched.  Technical
    suggestions for the generation of random keys will be found in RFC
    4086 [14].  One should carefully assess if the random number
    generator used during key generation adheres to these suggestions.
 
    Keys with a long effectivity period are particularly sensitive as
    they will represent a more valuable target and be subject to attack
    for a longer time than short-period keys.  It is strongly recommended
    that long-term key generation occur off-line in a manner isolated
    from the network via an air gap or, at a minimum, high-level secure
    hardware.
 
 3.3.  Key Effectivity Period
 
    For various reasons, keys in DNSSEC need to be changed once in a
    while.  The longer a key is in use, the greater the probability that
    it will have been compromised through carelessness, accident,
    espionage, or cryptanalysis.  Furthermore, when key rollovers are too
    rare an event, they will not become part of the operational habit and
    there is risk that nobody on-site will remember the procedure for
    rollover when the need is there.
 
    From a purely operational perspective, a reasonable key effectivity
    period for Key Signing Keys is 13 months, with the intent to replace
    them after 12 months.  An intended key effectivity period of a month
    is reasonable for Zone Signing Keys.
 
    For key sizes that match these effectivity periods, see Section 3.5.
 
    As argued in Section 3.1.2, securely updating trust anchors will be
    extremely difficult.  On the other hand, the "operational habit"
    argument does also apply to trust anchor reconfiguration.  If a short
    key effectivity period is used and the trust anchor configuration has
    to be revisited on a regular basis, the odds that the configuration
    tends to be forgotten is smaller.  The trade-off is against a system
    that is so dynamic that administrators of the validating clients will
    not be able to follow the modifications.
 
    Key effectivity periods can be made very short, as in a few minutes.
    But when replacing keys one has to take the considerations from
    Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 into account.
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 3.4.  Key Algorithm
 
    There are currently three different types of algorithms that can be
    used in DNSSEC: RSA, DSA, and elliptic curve cryptography.  The
    latter is fairly new and has yet to be standardized for usage in
    DNSSEC.
 
    RSA has been developed in an open and transparent manner.  As the
    patent on RSA expired in 2000, its use is now also free.
 
    DSA has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and
    Technology (NIST).  The creation of signatures takes roughly the same
    time as with RSA, but is 10 to 40 times as slow for verification
    [17].
 
    We suggest the use of RSA/SHA-1 as the preferred algorithm for the
    key.  The current known attacks on RSA can be defeated by making your
    key longer.  As the MD5 hashing algorithm is showing cracks, we
    recommend the usage of SHA-1.
 
    At the time of publication, it is known that the SHA-1 hash has
    cryptanalysis issues.  There is work in progress on addressing these
    issues.  We recommend the use of public key algorithms based on
    hashes stronger than SHA-1 (e.g., SHA-256), as soon as these
    algorithms are available in protocol specifications (see [19] and
    [20]) and implementations.
 
 3.5.  Key Sizes
 
    When choosing key sizes, zone administrators will need to take into
    account how long a key will be used, how much data will be signed
    during the key publication period (see Section 8.10 of [17]), and,
    optionally, how large the key size of the parent is.  As the chain of
    trust really is "a chain", there is not much sense in making one of
    the keys in the chain several times larger then the others.  As
    always, it’s the weakest link that defines the strength of the entire
    chain.  Also see Section 3.1.1 for a discussion of how keys serving
    different roles (ZSK vs. KSK) may need different key sizes.
 
    Generating a key of the correct size is a difficult problem; RFC 3766
    [13] tries to deal with that problem.  The first part of the
    selection procedure in Section 1 of the RFC states:
 
       1. Determine the attack resistance necessary to satisfy the
          security requirements of the application.  Do this by
          estimating the minimum number of computer operations that the
          attacker will be forced to do in order to compromise the
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          security of the system and then take the logarithm base two of
          that number.  Call that logarithm value "n".
 
          A 1996 report recommended 90 bits as a good all-around choice
          for system security.  The 90 bit number should be increased by
          about 2/3 bit/year, or about 96 bits in 2005.
 
    [13] goes on to explain how this number "n" can be used to calculate
    the key sizes in public key cryptography.  This culminated in the
    table given below (slightly modified for our purpose):
 
       +-------------+-----------+--------------+
       | System      |           |              |
       | requirement | Symmetric | RSA or DSA   |
       | for attack  | key size  | modulus size |
       | resistance  | (bits)    | (bits)       |
       | (bits)      |           |              |
       +-------------+-----------+--------------+
       |     70      |     70    |      947     |
       |     80      |     80    |     1228     |
       |     90      |     90    |     1553     |
       |    100      |    100    |     1926     |
       |    150      |    150    |     4575     |
       |    200      |    200    |     8719     |
       |    250      |    250    |    14596     |
       +-------------+-----------+--------------+
 
    The key sizes given are rather large.  This is because these keys are
    resilient against a trillionaire attacker.  Assuming this rich
    attacker will not attack your key and that the key is rolled over
    once a year, we come to the following recommendations about KSK
    sizes: 1024 bits for low-value domains, 1300 bits for medium-value
    domains, and 2048 bits for high-value domains.
 
    Whether a domain is of low, medium, or high value depends solely on
    the views of the zone owner.  One could, for instance, view leaf
    nodes in the DNS as of low value, and top-level domains (TLDs) or the
    root zone of high value.  The suggested key sizes should be safe for
    the next 5 years.
 
    As ZSKs can be rolled over more easily (and thus more often), the key
    sizes can be made smaller.  But as said in the introduction of this
    paragraph, making the ZSKs’ key sizes too small (in relation to the
    KSKs’ sizes) doesn’t make much sense.  Try to limit the difference in
    size to about 100 bits.
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    Note that nobody can see into the future and that these key sizes are
    only provided here as a guide.  Further information can be found in
    [16] and Section 7.5 of [17].  It should be noted though that [16] is
    already considered overly optimistic about what key sizes are
    considered safe.
 
    One final note concerning key sizes.  Larger keys will increase the
    sizes of the RRSIG and DNSKEY records and will therefore increase the
    chance of DNS UDP packet overflow.  Also, the time it takes to
    validate and create RRSIGs increases with larger keys, so don’t
    needlessly double your key sizes.
 
 3.6.  Private Key Storage
 
    It is recommended that, where possible, zone private keys and the
    zone file master copy that is to be signed be kept and used in off-
    line, non-network-connected, physically secure machines only.
    Periodically, an application can be run to add authentication to a
    zone by adding RRSIG and NSEC RRs.  Then the augmented file can be
    transferred.
 
    When relying on dynamic update to manage a signed zone [10], be aware
    that at least one private key of the zone will have to reside on the
    master server.  This key is only as secure as the amount of exposure
    the server receives to unknown clients and the security of the host.
    Although not mandatory, one could administer the DNS in the following
    way.  The master that processes the dynamic updates is unavailable
    from generic hosts on the Internet, it is not listed in the NS RR
    set, although its name appears in the SOA RRs MNAME field.  The
    nameservers in the NS RRSet are able to receive zone updates through
    NOTIFY, IXFR, AXFR, or an out-of-band distribution mechanism.  This
    approach is known as the "hidden master" setup.
 
    The ideal situation is to have a one-way information flow to the
    network to avoid the possibility of tampering from the network.
    Keeping the zone master file on-line on the network and simply
    cycling it through an off-line signer does not do this.  The on-line
    version could still be tampered with if the host it resides on is
    compromised.  For maximum security, the master copy of the zone file
    should be off-net and should not be updated based on an unsecured
    network mediated communication.
 
    In general, keeping a zone file off-line will not be practical and
    the machines on which zone files are maintained will be connected to
    a network.  Operators are advised to take security measures to shield
    unauthorized access to the master copy.
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    For dynamically updated secured zones [10], both the master copy and
    the private key that is used to update signatures on updated RRs will
    need to be on-line.
 
 4.  Signature Generation, Key Rollover, and Related Policies
 
 4.1.  Time in DNSSEC
 
    Without DNSSEC, all times in the DNS are relative.  The SOA fields
    REFRESH, RETRY, and EXPIRATION are timers used to determine the time
    elapsed after a slave server synchronized with a master server.  The
    Time to Live (TTL) value and the SOA RR minimum TTL parameter [11]
    are used to determine how long a forwarder should cache data after it
    has been fetched from an authoritative server.  By using a signature
    validity period, DNSSEC introduces the notion of an absolute time in
    the DNS.  Signatures in DNSSEC have an expiration date after which
    the signature is marked as invalid and the signed data is to be
    considered Bogus.
 
 4.1.1.  Time Considerations
 
    Because of the expiration of signatures, one should consider the
    following:
 
    o  We suggest the Maximum Zone TTL of your zone data to be a fraction
       of your signature validity period.
 
          If the TTL would be of similar order as the signature validity
          period, then all RRSets fetched during the validity period
          would be cached until the signature expiration time.  Section
          7.1 of [4] suggests that "the resolver may use the time
          remaining before expiration of the signature validity period of
          a signed RRSet as an upper bound for the TTL".  As a result,
          query load on authoritative servers would peak at signature
          expiration time, as this is also the time at which records
          simultaneously expire from caches.
 
          To avoid query load peaks, we suggest the TTL on all the RRs in
          your zone to be at least a few times smaller than your
          signature validity period.
 
    o  We suggest the signature publication period to end at least one
       Maximum Zone TTL duration before the end of the signature validity
       period.
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          Re-signing a zone shortly before the end of the signature
          validity period may cause simultaneous expiration of data from
          caches.  This in turn may lead to peaks in the load on
          authoritative servers.
 
    o  We suggest the Minimum Zone TTL to be long enough to both fetch
       and verify all the RRs in the trust chain.  In workshop
       environments, it has been demonstrated [18] that a low TTL (under
       5 to 10 minutes) caused disruptions because of the following two
       problems:
 
          1.  During validation, some data may expire before the
              validation is complete.  The validator should be able to
              keep all data until it is completed.  This applies to all
              RRs needed to complete the chain of trust: DSes, DNSKEYs,
              RRSIGs, and the final answers, i.e., the RRSet that is
              returned for the initial query.
 
          2.  Frequent verification causes load on recursive nameservers.
              Data at delegation points, DSes, DNSKEYs, and RRSIGs
              benefit from caching.  The TTL on those should be
              relatively long.
 
    o  Slave servers will need to be able to fetch newly signed zones
       well before the RRSIGs in the zone served by the slave server pass
       their signature expiration time.
 
          When a slave server is out of sync with its master and data in
          a zone is signed by expired signatures, it may be better for
          the slave server not to give out any answer.
 
          Normally, a slave server that is not able to contact a master
          server for an extended period will expire a zone.  When that
          happens, the server will respond differently to queries for
          that zone.  Some servers issue SERVFAIL, whereas others turn
          off the ’AA’ bit in the answers.  The time of expiration is set
          in the SOA record and is relative to the last successful
          refresh between the master and the slave servers.  There exists
          no coupling between the signature expiration of RRSIGs in the
          zone and the expire parameter in the SOA.
 
          If the server serves a DNSSEC zone, then it may well happen
          that the signatures expire well before the SOA expiration timer
          counts down to zero.  It is not possible to completely prevent
          this from happening by tweaking the SOA parameters.  However,
          the effects can be minimized where the SOA expiration time is
          equal to or shorter than the signature validity period.  The
          consequence of an authoritative server not being able to update
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          a zone, whilst that zone includes expired signatures, is that
          non-secure resolvers will continue to be able to resolve data
          served by the particular slave servers while security-aware
          resolvers will experience problems because of answers being
          marked as Bogus.
 
          We suggest the SOA expiration timer being approximately one
          third or one fourth of the signature validity period.  It will
          allow problems with transfers from the master server to be
          noticed before the actual signature times out.  We also suggest
          that operators of nameservers that supply secondary services
          develop ’watch dogs’ to spot upcoming signature expirations in
          zones they slave, and take appropriate action.
 
          When determining the value for the expiration parameter one has
          to take the following into account: What are the chances that
          all my secondaries expire the zone? How quickly can I reach an
          administrator of secondary servers to load a valid zone?  These
          questions are not DNSSEC specific but may influence the choice
          of your signature validity intervals.
 
 4.2.  Key Rollovers
 
    A DNSSEC key cannot be used forever (see Section 3.3).  So key
    rollovers -- or supercessions, as they are sometimes called -- are a
    fact of life when using DNSSEC.  Zone administrators who are in the
    process of rolling their keys have to take into account that data
    published in previous versions of their zone still lives in caches.
    When deploying DNSSEC, this becomes an important consideration;
    ignoring data that may be in caches may lead to loss of service for
    clients.
 
    The most pressing example of this occurs when zone material signed
    with an old key is being validated by a resolver that does not have
    the old zone key cached.  If the old key is no longer present in the
    current zone, this validation fails, marking the data "Bogus".
    Alternatively, an attempt could be made to validate data that is
    signed with a new key against an old key that lives in a local cache,
    also resulting in data being marked "Bogus".
 
 4.2.1.  Zone Signing Key Rollovers
 
    For "Zone Signing Key rollovers", there are two ways to make sure
    that during the rollover data still cached can be verified with the
    new key sets or newly generated signatures can be verified with the
    keys still in caches.  One schema, described in Section 4.2.1.2, uses
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    double signatures; the other uses key pre-publication (Section
    4.2.1.1).  The pros, cons, and recommendations are described in
    Section 4.2.1.3.
 
 4.2.1.1.  Pre-Publish Key Rollover
 
    This section shows how to perform a ZSK rollover without the need to
    sign all the data in a zone twice -- the "pre-publish key rollover".
    This method has advantages in the case of a key compromise.  If the
    old key is compromised, the new key has already been distributed in
    the DNS.  The zone administrator is then able to quickly switch to
    the new key and remove the compromised key from the zone.  Another
    major advantage is that the zone size does not double, as is the case
    with the double signature ZSK rollover.  A small "how-to" for this
    kind of rollover can be found in Appendix B.
 
    Pre-publish key rollover involves four stages as follows:
 
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
       initial         new DNSKEY       new RRSIGs      DNSKEY removal
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
       SOA0            SOA1             SOA2            SOA3
       RRSIG10(SOA0)   RRSIG10(SOA1)    RRSIG11(SOA2)   RRSIG11(SOA3)
 
       DNSKEY1         DNSKEY1          DNSKEY1         DNSKEY1
       DNSKEY10        DNSKEY10         DNSKEY10        DNSKEY11
       DNSKEY11         DNSKEY11
       RRSIG1 (DNSKEY) RRSIG1 (DNSKEY)  RRSIG1(DNSKEY)  RRSIG1 (DNSKEY)
       RRSIG10(DNSKEY) RRSIG10(DNSKEY)  RRSIG11(DNSKEY) RRSIG11(DNSKEY)
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
 
                          Pre-Publish Key Rollover
 
    initial: Initial version of the zone: DNSKEY 1 is the Key Signing
       Key.  DNSKEY 10 is used to sign all the data of the zone, the Zone
       Signing Key.
 
    new DNSKEY: DNSKEY 11 is introduced into the key set.  Note that no
       signatures are generated with this key yet, but this does not
       secure against brute force attacks on the public key.  The minimum
       duration of this pre-roll phase is the time it takes for the data
       to propagate to the authoritative servers plus TTL value of the
       key set.
 
    new RRSIGs: At the "new RRSIGs" stage (SOA serial 2), DNSKEY 11 is
       used to sign the data in the zone exclusively (i.e., all the
       signatures from DNSKEY 10 are removed from the zone).  DNSKEY 10
       remains published in the key set.  This way data that was loaded
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       into caches from version 1 of the zone can still be verified with
       key sets fetched from version 2 of the zone.  The minimum time
       that the key set including DNSKEY 10 is to be published is the
       time that it takes for zone data from the previous version of the
       zone to expire from old caches, i.e., the time it takes for this
       zone to propagate to all authoritative servers plus the Maximum
       Zone TTL value of any of the data in the previous version of the
       zone.
 
    DNSKEY removal: DNSKEY 10 is removed from the zone.  The key set, now
       only containing DNSKEY 1 and DNSKEY 11, is re-signed with the
       DNSKEY 1.
 
    The above scheme can be simplified by always publishing the "future"
    key immediately after the rollover.  The scheme would look as follows
    (we show two rollovers); the future key is introduced in "new DNSKEY"
    as DNSKEY 12 and again a newer one, numbered 13, in "new DNSKEY
    (II)":
 
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
       initial             new RRSIGs          new DNSKEY
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
       SOA0                SOA1                SOA2
       RRSIG10(SOA0)       RRSIG11(SOA1)       RRSIG11(SOA2)
 
       DNSKEY1             DNSKEY1             DNSKEY1
       DNSKEY10            DNSKEY10            DNSKEY11
       DNSKEY11            DNSKEY11            DNSKEY12
       RRSIG1(DNSKEY)      RRSIG1 (DNSKEY)     RRSIG1(DNSKEY)
       RRSIG10(DNSKEY)     RRSIG11(DNSKEY)     RRSIG11(DNSKEY)
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
 
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
       new RRSIGs (II)     new DNSKEY (II)
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
       SOA3                SOA4
       RRSIG12(SOA3)       RRSIG12(SOA4)
 
       DNSKEY1             DNSKEY1
       DNSKEY11            DNSKEY12
       DNSKEY12            DNSKEY13
       RRSIG1(DNSKEY)      RRSIG1(DNSKEY)
       RRSIG12(DNSKEY)     RRSIG12(DNSKEY)
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
 
               Pre-Publish Key Rollover, Showing Two Rollovers
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    Note that the key introduced in the "new DNSKEY" phase is not used
    for production yet; the private key can thus be stored in a
    physically secure manner and does not need to be ’fetched’ every time
    a zone needs to be signed.
 
 4.2.1.2.  Double Signature Zone Signing Key Rollover
 
    This section shows how to perform a ZSK key rollover using the double
    zone data signature scheme, aptly named "double signature rollover".
 
    During the "new DNSKEY" stage the new version of the zone file will
    need to propagate to all authoritative servers and the data that
    exists in (distant) caches will need to expire, requiring at least
    the Maximum Zone TTL.
 
    Double signature ZSK rollover involves three stages as follows:
 
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
       initial             new DNSKEY         DNSKEY removal
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
       SOA0                SOA1               SOA2
       RRSIG10(SOA0)       RRSIG10(SOA1)      RRSIG11(SOA2)
       RRSIG11(SOA1)
 
       DNSKEY1             DNSKEY1            DNSKEY1
       DNSKEY10            DNSKEY10           DNSKEY11
       DNSKEY11
       RRSIG1(DNSKEY)      RRSIG1(DNSKEY)     RRSIG1(DNSKEY)
       RRSIG10(DNSKEY)     RRSIG10(DNSKEY)    RRSIG11(DNSKEY)
       RRSIG11(DNSKEY)
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
 
                 Double Signature Zone Signing Key Rollover
 
    initial: Initial Version of the zone: DNSKEY 1 is the Key Signing
       Key.  DNSKEY 10 is used to sign all the data of the zone, the Zone
       Signing Key.
 
    new DNSKEY: At the "New DNSKEY" stage (SOA serial 1) DNSKEY 11 is
       introduced into the key set and all the data in the zone is signed
       with DNSKEY 10 and DNSKEY 11.  The rollover period will need to
       continue until all data from version 0 of the zone has expired
       from remote caches.  This will take at least the Maximum Zone TTL
       of version 0 of the zone.
 
    DNSKEY removal: DNSKEY 10 is removed from the zone.  All the
       signatures from DNSKEY 10 are removed from the zone.  The key set,
       now only containing DNSKEY 11, is re-signed with DNSKEY 1.
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    At every instance, RRSIGs from the previous version of the zone can
    be verified with the DNSKEY RRSet from the current version and the
    other way around.  The data from the current version can be verified
    with the data from the previous version of the zone.  The duration of
    the "new DNSKEY" phase and the period between rollovers should be at
    least the Maximum Zone TTL.
 
    Making sure that the "new DNSKEY" phase lasts until the signature
    expiration time of the data in initial version of the zone is
    recommended.  This way all caches are cleared of the old signatures.
    However, this duration could be considerably longer than the Maximum
    Zone TTL, making the rollover a lengthy procedure.
 
    Note that in this example we assumed that the zone was not modified
    during the rollover.  New data can be introduced in the zone as long
    as it is signed with both keys.
 
 4.2.1.3.  Pros and Cons of the Schemes
 
    Pre-publish key rollover: This rollover does not involve signing the
       zone data twice.  Instead, before the actual rollover, the new key
       is published in the key set and thus is available for
       cryptanalysis attacks.  A small disadvantage is that this process
       requires four steps.  Also the pre-publish scheme involves more
       parental work when used for KSK rollovers as explained in Section
       4.2.3.
 
    Double signature ZSK rollover: The drawback of this signing scheme is
       that during the rollover the number of signatures in your zone
       doubles; this may be prohibitive if you have very big zones.  An
       advantage is that it only requires three steps.
 
 4.2.2.  Key Signing Key Rollovers
 
    For the rollover of a Key Signing Key, the same considerations as for
    the rollover of a Zone Signing Key apply.  However, we can use a
    double signature scheme to guarantee that old data (only the apex key
    set) in caches can be verified with a new key set and vice versa.
    Since only the key set is signed with a KSK, zone size considerations
    do not apply.
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    --------------------------------------------------------------------
        initial        new DNSKEY        DS change       DNSKEY removal
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
      Parent:
        SOA0           -------->         SOA1            -------->
        RRSIGpar(SOA0) -------->         RRSIGpar(SOA1)  -------->
        DS1            -------->         DS2             -------->
        RRSIGpar(DS)   -------->         RRSIGpar(DS)    -------->
 
 
      Child:
        SOA0            SOA1             -------->       SOA2
        RRSIG10(SOA0)   RRSIG10(SOA1)    -------->       RRSIG10(SOA2)
                                         -------->
        DNSKEY1         DNSKEY1          -------->       DNSKEY2
                        DNSKEY2          -------->
        DNSKEY10        DNSKEY10         -------->       DNSKEY10
        RRSIG1 (DNSKEY) RRSIG1 (DNSKEY)  -------->       RRSIG2 (DNSKEY)
                        RRSIG2 (DNSKEY)  -------->
        RRSIG10(DNSKEY) RRSIG10(DNSKEY)  -------->       RRSIG10(DNSKEY)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
 
    Stages of Deployment for a Double Signature Key Signing Key Rollover
 
    initial: Initial version of the zone.  The parental DS points to
       DNSKEY1.  Before the rollover starts, the child will have to
       verify what the TTL is of the DS RR that points to DNSKEY1 -- it
       is needed during the rollover and we refer to the value as TTL_DS.
 
    new DNSKEY: During the "new DNSKEY" phase, the zone administrator
       generates a second KSK, DNSKEY2.  The key is provided to the
       parent, and the child will have to wait until a new DS RR has been
       generated that points to DNSKEY2.  After that DS RR has been
       published on all servers authoritative for the parent’s zone, the
       zone administrator has to wait at least TTL_DS to make sure that
       the old DS RR has expired from caches.
 
    DS change: The parent replaces DS1 with DS2.
 
    DNSKEY removal: DNSKEY1 has been removed.
 
    The scenario above puts the responsibility for maintaining a valid
    chain of trust with the child.  It also is based on the premise that
    the parent only has one DS RR (per algorithm) per zone.  An
    alternative mechanism has been considered.  Using an established
    trust relation, the interaction can be performed in-band, and the
    removal of the keys by the child can possibly be signaled by the
    parent.  In this mechanism, there are periods where there are two DS
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    RRs at the parent.  Since at the moment of writing the protocol for
    this interaction has not been developed, further discussion is out of
    scope for this document.
 
 4.2.3.  Difference Between ZSK and KSK Rollovers
 
    Note that KSK rollovers and ZSK rollovers are different in the sense
    that a KSK rollover requires interaction with the parent (and
    possibly replacing of trust anchors) and the ensuing delay while
    waiting for it.
 
    A zone key rollover can be handled in two different ways: pre-publish
    (Section 4.2.1.1) and double signature (Section 4.2.1.2).
 
    As the KSK is used to validate the key set and because the KSK is not
    changed during a ZSK rollover, a cache is able to validate the new
    key set of the zone.  The pre-publish method would also work for a
    KSK rollover.  The records that are to be pre-published are the
    parental DS RRs.  The pre-publish method has some drawbacks for KSKs.
    We first describe the rollover scheme and then indicate these
    drawbacks.
 
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
      initial         new DS           new DNSKEY      DS/DNSKEY removal
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    Parent:
      SOA0            SOA1             -------->       SOA2
      RRSIGpar(SOA0)  RRSIGpar(SOA1)   -------->       RRSIGpar(SOA2)
      DS1             DS1              -------->       DS2
                      DS2              -------->
      RRSIGpar(DS)    RRSIGpar(DS)     -------->       RRSIGpar(DS)
 
 
    Child:
      SOA0            -------->        SOA1            SOA1
      RRSIG10(SOA0)   -------->        RRSIG10(SOA1)   RRSIG10(SOA1)
                      -------->
      DNSKEY1         -------->        DNSKEY2         DNSKEY2
                      -------->
      DNSKEY10        -------->        DNSKEY10        DNSKEY10
      RRSIG1 (DNSKEY) -------->        RRSIG2(DNSKEY)  RRSIG2 (DNSKEY)
      RRSIG10(DNSKEY) -------->        RRSIG10(DNSKEY) RRSIG10(DNSKEY)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
 
       Stages of Deployment for a Pre-Publish Key Signing Key Rollover
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    When the child zone wants to roll, it notifies the parent during the
    "new DS" phase and submits the new key (or the corresponding DS) to
    the parent.  The parent publishes DS1 and DS2, pointing to DNSKEY1
    and DNSKEY2, respectively.  During the rollover ("new DNSKEY" phase),
    which can take place as soon as the new DS set propagated through the
    DNS, the child replaces DNSKEY1 with DNSKEY2.  Immediately after that
    ("DS/DNSKEY removal" phase), it can notify the parent that the old DS
    record can be deleted.
 
    The drawbacks of this scheme are that during the "new DS" phase the
    parent cannot verify the match between the DS2 RR and DNSKEY2 using
    the DNS -- as DNSKEY2 is not yet published.  Besides, we introduce a
    "security lame" key (see Section 4.4.3).  Finally, the child-parent
    interaction consists of two steps.  The "double signature" method
    only needs one interaction.
 
 4.2.4.  Automated Key Rollovers
 
    As keys must be renewed periodically, there is some motivation to
    automate the rollover process.  Consider the following:
 
    o  ZSK rollovers are easy to automate as only the child zone is
       involved.
 
    o  A KSK rollover needs interaction between parent and child.  Data
       exchange is needed to provide the new keys to the parent;
       consequently, this data must be authenticated and integrity must
       be guaranteed in order to avoid attacks on the rollover.
 
 4.3.  Planning for Emergency Key Rollover
 
    This section deals with preparation for a possible key compromise.
    Our advice is to have a documented procedure ready for when a key
    compromise is suspected or confirmed.
 
    When the private material of one of your keys is compromised it can
    be used for as long as a valid trust chain exists.  A trust chain
    remains intact for
 
    o  as long as a signature over the compromised key in the trust chain
       is valid,
 
    o  as long as a parental DS RR (and signature) points to the
       compromised key,
 
    o  as long as the key is anchored in a resolver and is used as a
       starting point for validation (this is generally the hardest to
       update).
 
 
 
 Kolkman & Gieben             Informational                     [Page 21] 
 RFC 4641              DNSSEC Operational Practices        September 2006
 
 
    While a trust chain to your compromised key exists, your namespace is
    vulnerable to abuse by anyone who has obtained illegitimate
    possession of the key.  Zone operators have to make a trade-off if
    the abuse of the compromised key is worse than having data in caches
    that cannot be validated.  If the zone operator chooses to break the
    trust chain to the compromised key, data in caches signed with this
    key cannot be validated.  However, if the zone administrator chooses
    to take the path of a regular rollover, the malicious key holder can
    spoof data so that it appears to be valid.
 
 4.3.1.  KSK Compromise
 
    A zone containing a DNSKEY RRSet with a compromised KSK is vulnerable
    as long as the compromised KSK is configured as trust anchor or a
    parental DS points to it.
 
    A compromised KSK can be used to sign the key set of an attacker’s
    zone.  That zone could be used to poison the DNS.
 
    Therefore, when the KSK has been compromised, the trust anchor or the
    parental DS should be replaced as soon as possible.  It is local
    policy whether to break the trust chain during the emergency
    rollover.  The trust chain would be broken when the compromised KSK
    is removed from the child’s zone while the parent still has a DS
    pointing to the compromised KSK (the assumption is that there is only
    one DS at the parent.  If there are multiple DSes this does not apply
    -- however the chain of trust of this particular key is broken).
 
    Note that an attacker’s zone still uses the compromised KSK and the
    presence of a parental DS would cause the data in this zone to appear
    as valid.  Removing the compromised key would cause the attacker’s
    zone to appear as valid and the child’s zone as Bogus.  Therefore, we
    advise not to remove the KSK before the parent has a DS to a new KSK
    in place.
 
 4.3.1.1.  Keeping the Chain of Trust Intact
 
    If we follow this advice, the timing of the replacement of the KSK is
    somewhat critical.  The goal is to remove the compromised KSK as soon
    as the new DS RR is available at the parent.  And also make sure that
    the signature made with a new KSK over the key set with the
    compromised KSK in it expires just after the new DS appears at the
    parent, thus removing the old cruft in one swoop.
 
    The procedure is as follows:
 
    1.  Introduce a new KSK into the key set, keep the compromised KSK in
        the key set.
 
 
 
 Kolkman & Gieben             Informational                     [Page 22] 
 RFC 4641              DNSSEC Operational Practices        September 2006
 
 
    2.  Sign the key set, with a short validity period.  The validity
        period should expire shortly after the DS is expected to appear
        in the parent and the old DSes have expired from caches.
 
    3.  Upload the DS for this new key to the parent.
 
    4.  Follow the procedure of the regular KSK rollover: Wait for the DS
        to appear in the authoritative servers and then wait as long as
        the TTL of the old DS RRs.  If necessary re-sign the DNSKEY RRSet
        and modify/extend the expiration time.
 
    5.  Remove the compromised DNSKEY RR from the zone and re-sign the
        key set using your "normal" validity interval.
 
    An additional danger of a key compromise is that the compromised key
    could be used to facilitate a legitimate DNSKEY/DS rollover and/or
    nameserver changes at the parent.  When that happens, the domain may
    be in dispute.  An authenticated out-of-band and secure notify
    mechanism to contact a parent is needed in this case.
 
    Note that this is only a problem when the DNSKEY and or DS records
    are used for authentication at the parent.
 
 4.3.1.2.  Breaking the Chain of Trust
 
    There are two methods to break the chain of trust.  The first method
    causes the child zone to appear ’Bogus’ to validating resolvers.  The
    other causes the child zone to appear ’insecure’.  These are
    described below.
 
    In the method that causes the child zone to appear ’Bogus’ to
    validating resolvers, the child zone replaces the current KSK with a
    new one and re-signs the key set.  Next it sends the DS of the new
    key to the parent.  Only after the parent has placed the new DS in
    the zone is the child’s chain of trust repaired.
 
    An alternative method of breaking the chain of trust is by removing
    the DS RRs from the parent zone altogether.  As a result, the child
    zone would become insecure.
 
 4.3.2.  ZSK Compromise
 
    Primarily because there is no parental interaction required when a
    ZSK is compromised, the situation is less severe than with a KSK
    compromise.  The zone must still be re-signed with a new ZSK as soon
    as possible.  As this is a local operation and requires no
    communication between the parent and child, this can be achieved
    fairly quickly.  However, one has to take into account that just as
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    with a normal rollover the immediate disappearance of the old
    compromised key may lead to verification problems.  Also note that as
    long as the RRSIG over the compromised ZSK is not expired the zone
    may be still at risk.
 
 4.3.3.  Compromises of Keys Anchored in Resolvers
 
    A key can also be pre-configured in resolvers.  For instance, if
    DNSSEC is successfully deployed the root key may be pre-configured in
    most security aware resolvers.
 
    If trust-anchor keys are compromised, the resolvers using these keys
    should be notified of this fact.  Zone administrators may consider
    setting up a mailing list to communicate the fact that a SEP key is
    about to be rolled over.  This communication will of course need to
    be authenticated, e.g., by using digital signatures.
 
    End-users faced with the task of updating an anchored key should
    always validate the new key.  New keys should be authenticated out-
    of-band, for example, through the use of an announcement website that
    is secured using secure sockets (TLS) [21].
 
 4.4.  Parental Policies
 
 4.4.1.  Initial Key Exchanges and Parental Policies Considerations
 
    The initial key exchange is always subject to the policies set by the
    parent.  When designing a key exchange policy one should take into
    account that the authentication and authorization mechanisms used
    during a key exchange should be as strong as the authentication and
    authorization mechanisms used for the exchange of delegation
    information between parent and child.  That is, there is no implicit
    need in DNSSEC to make the authentication process stronger than it
    was in DNS.
 
    Using the DNS itself as the source for the actual DNSKEY material,
    with an out-of-band check on the validity of the DNSKEY, has the
    benefit that it reduces the chances of user error.  A DNSKEY query
    tool can make use of the SEP bit [3] to select the proper key from a
    DNSSEC key set, thereby reducing the chance that the wrong DNSKEY is
    sent.  It can validate the self-signature over a key; thereby
    verifying the ownership of the private key material.  Fetching the
    DNSKEY from the DNS ensures that the chain of trust remains intact
    once the parent publishes the DS RR indicating the child is secure.
 
    Note: the out-of-band verification is still needed when the key
    material is fetched via the DNS.  The parent can never be sure
    whether or not the DNSKEY RRs have been spoofed.
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 4.4.2.  Storing Keys or Hashes?
 
    When designing a registry system one should consider which of the
    DNSKEYs and/or the corresponding DSes to store.  Since a child zone
    might wish to have a DS published using a message digest algorithm
    not yet understood by the registry, the registry can’t count on being
    able to generate the DS record from a raw DNSKEY.  Thus, we recommend
    that registry systems at least support storing DS records.
 
    It may also be useful to store DNSKEYs, since having them may help
    during troubleshooting and, as long as the child’s chosen message
    digest is supported, the overhead of generating DS records from them
    is minimal.  Having an out-of-band mechanism, such as a registry
    directory (e.g., Whois), to find out which keys are used to generate
    DS Resource Records for specific owners and/or zones may also help
    with troubleshooting.
 
    The storage considerations also relate to the design of the customer
    interface and the method by which data is transferred between
    registrant and registry; Will the child zone administrator be able to
    upload DS RRs with unknown hash algorithms or does the interface only
    allow DNSKEYs?  In the registry-registrar model, one can use the
    DNSSEC extensions to the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) [15],
    which allows transfer of DS RRs and optionally DNSKEY RRs.
 
 4.4.3.  Security Lameness
 
    Security lameness is defined as what happens when a parent has a DS
    RR pointing to a non-existing DNSKEY RR.  When this happens, the
    child’s zone may be marked "Bogus" by verifying DNS clients.
 
    As part of a comprehensive delegation check, the parent could, at key
    exchange time, verify that the child’s key is actually configured in
    the DNS.  However, if a parent does not understand the hashing
    algorithm used by child, the parental checks are limited to only
    comparing the key id.
 
    Child zones should be very careful in removing DNSKEY material,
    specifically SEP keys, for which a DS RR exists.
 
    Once a zone is "security lame", a fix (e.g., removing a DS RR) will
    take time to propagate through the DNS.
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 4.4.4.  DS Signature Validity Period
 
    Since the DS can be replayed as long as it has a valid signature, a
    short signature validity period over the DS minimizes the time a
    child is vulnerable in the case of a compromise of the child’s
    KSK(s).  A signature validity period that is too short introduces the
    possibility that a zone is marked "Bogus" in case of a configuration
    error in the signer.  There may not be enough time to fix the
    problems before signatures expire.  Something as mundane as operator
    unavailability during weekends shows the need for DS signature
    validity periods longer than 2 days.  We recommend an absolute
    minimum for a DS signature validity period of a few days.
 
    The maximum signature validity period of the DS record depends on how
    long child zones are willing to be vulnerable after a key compromise.
    On the other hand, shortening the DS signature validity interval
    increases the operational risk for the parent.  Therefore, the parent
    may have policy to use a signature validity interval that is
    considerably longer than the child would hope for.
 
    A compromise between the operational constraints of the parent and
    minimizing damage for the child may result in a DS signature validity
    period somewhere between a week and months.
 
    In addition to the signature validity period, which sets a lower
    bound on the number of times the zone owner will need to sign the
    zone data and which sets an upper bound to the time a child is
    vulnerable after key compromise, there is the TTL value on the DS
    RRs.  Shortening the TTL means that the authoritative servers will
    see more queries.  But on the other hand, a short TTL lowers the
    persistence of DS RRSets in caches thereby increasing the speed with
    which updated DS RRSets propagate through the DNS.
 
 5.  Security Considerations
 
    DNSSEC adds data integrity to the DNS.  This document tries to assess
    the operational considerations to maintain a stable and secure DNSSEC
    service.  Not taking into account the ’data propagation’ properties
    in the DNS will cause validation failures and may make secured zones
    unavailable to security-aware resolvers.
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 Appendix A.  Terminology
 
    In this document, there is some jargon used that is defined in other
    documents.  In most cases, we have not copied the text from the
    documents defining the terms but have given a more elaborate
    explanation of the meaning.  Note that these explanations should not
    be seen as authoritative.
 
    Anchored key: A DNSKEY configured in resolvers around the globe.
       This key is hard to update, hence the term anchored.
 
    Bogus: Also see Section 5 of [4].  An RRSet in DNSSEC is marked
       "Bogus" when a signature of an RRSet does not validate against a
       DNSKEY.
 
    Key Signing Key or KSK: A Key Signing Key (KSK) is a key that is used
       exclusively for signing the apex key set.  The fact that a key is
       a KSK is only relevant to the signing tool.
 
    Key size: The term ’key size’ can be substituted by ’modulus size’
       throughout the document.  It is mathematically more correct to use
       modulus size, but as this is a document directed at operators we
       feel more at ease with the term key size.
 
    Private and public keys: DNSSEC secures the DNS through the use of
       public key cryptography.  Public key cryptography is based on the
       existence of two (mathematically related) keys, a public key and a
       private key.  The public keys are published in the DNS by use of
       the DNSKEY Resource Record (DNSKEY RR).  Private keys should
       remain private.
 
    Key rollover: A key rollover (also called key supercession in some
       environments) is the act of replacing one key pair with another at
       the end of a key effectivity period.
 
    Secure Entry Point (SEP) key: A KSK that has a parental DS record
       pointing to it or is configured as a trust anchor.  Although not
       required by the protocol, we recommend that the SEP flag [3] is
       set on these keys.
 
    Self-signature: This only applies to signatures over DNSKEYs; a
       signature made with DNSKEY x, over DNSKEY x is called a self-
       signature.  Note: without further information, self-signatures
       convey no trust.  They are useful to check the authenticity of the
       DNSKEY, i.e., they can be used as a hash.
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    Singing the zone file: The term used for the event where an
       administrator joyfully signs its zone file while producing melodic
       sound patterns.
 
    Signer: The system that has access to the private key material and
       signs the Resource Record sets in a zone.  A signer may be
       configured to sign only parts of the zone, e.g., only those RRSets
       for which existing signatures are about to expire.
 
    Zone Signing Key (ZSK): A key that is used for signing all data in a
       zone.  The fact that a key is a ZSK is only relevant to the
       signing tool.
 
    Zone administrator: The ’role’ that is responsible for signing a zone
       and publishing it on the primary authoritative server.
 
 Appendix B.  Zone Signing Key Rollover How-To
 
    Using the pre-published signature scheme and the most conservative
    method to assure oneself that data does not live in caches, here
    follows the "how-to".
 
    Step 0: The preparation: Create two keys and publish both in your key
       set.  Mark one of the keys "active" and the other "published".
       Use the "active" key for signing your zone data.  Store the
       private part of the "published" key, preferably off-line.  The
       protocol does not provide for attributes to mark a key as active
       or published.  This is something you have to do on your own,
       through the use of a notebook or key management tool.
 
    Step 1: Determine expiration: At the beginning of the rollover make a
       note of the highest expiration time of signatures in your zone
       file created with the current key marked as active.  Wait until
       the expiration time marked in Step 1 has passed.
 
    Step 2: Then start using the key that was marked "published" to sign
       your data (i.e., mark it "active").  Stop using the key that was
       marked "active"; mark it "rolled".
 
    Step 3: It is safe to engage in a new rollover (Step 1) after at
       least one signature validity period.
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 Appendix C.  Typographic Conventions
 
    The following typographic conventions are used in this document:
 
    Key notation: A key is denoted by DNSKEYx, where x is a number or an
    identifier, x could be thought of as the key id.
 
    RRSet notations: RRs are only denoted by the type.  All other
    information -- owner, class, rdata, and TTL--is left out.  Thus:
    "example.com 3600 IN A 192.0.2.1" is reduced to "A".  RRSets are a
    list of RRs.  A example of this would be "A1, A2", specifying the
    RRSet containing two "A" records.  This could again be abbreviated to
    just "A".
 
    Signature notation: Signatures are denoted as RRSIGx(RRSet), which
    means that RRSet is signed with DNSKEYx.
 
    Zone representation: Using the above notation we have simplified the
    representation of a signed zone by leaving out all unnecessary
    details such as the names and by representing all data by "SOAx"
 
    SOA representation: SOAs are represented as SOAx, where x is the
    serial number.
 
    Using this notation the following signed zone:
 
    example.net.      86400  IN SOA  ns.example.net. bert.example.net. (
                             2006022100   ; serial
                             86400        ; refresh (  24 hours)
                             7200         ; retry   (   2 hours)
                             3600000      ; expire  (1000 hours)
                             28800 )      ; minimum (   8 hours)
                      86400  RRSIG   SOA 5 2 86400 20130522213204 (
                                   20130422213204 14 example.net.
                                   cmL62SI6iAX46xGNQAdQ... )
                      86400  NS      a.iana-servers.net.
                      86400  NS      b.iana-servers.net.
                      86400  RRSIG   NS 5 2 86400 20130507213204 (
                                   20130407213204 14 example.net.
                                   SO5epiJei19AjXoUpFnQ ... )
                      86400  DNSKEY  256 3 5 (
                                   EtRB9MP5/AvOuVO0I8XDxy0... ) ; id = 14
                      86400  DNSKEY  257 3 5 (
                                   gsPW/Yy19GzYIY+Gnr8HABU... ) ; id = 15
                      86400  RRSIG   DNSKEY 5 2 86400 20130522213204 (
                                   20130422213204 14 example.net.
                                   J4zCe8QX4tXVGjV4e1r9... )
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                      86400  RRSIG   DNSKEY 5 2 86400 20130522213204 (
                                   20130422213204 15 example.net.
                                   keVDCOpsSeDReyV6O... )
                      86400  RRSIG   NSEC 5 2 86400 20130507213204 (
                                   20130407213204 14 example.net.
                                   obj3HEp1GjnmhRjX... )
    a.example.net.    86400  IN TXT  "A label"
                      86400  RRSIG   TXT 5 3 86400 20130507213204 (
                                   20130407213204 14 example.net.
                                   IkDMlRdYLmXH7QJnuF3v... )
                      86400  NSEC    b.example.com. TXT RRSIG NSEC
                      86400  RRSIG   NSEC 5 3 86400 20130507213204 (
                                   20130407213204 14 example.net.
                                   bZMjoZ3bHjnEz0nIsPMM... )
                      ...
 
    is reduced to the following representation:
 
        SOA2006022100
        RRSIG14(SOA2006022100)
        DNSKEY14
        DNSKEY15
 
        RRSIG14(KEY)
        RRSIG15(KEY)
 
    The rest of the zone data has the same signature as the SOA record,
    i.e., an RRSIG created with DNSKEY 14.
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